The proposal to create an online version of L was accepted and funded by the TWT. A statement of work was created, request for proposal submitted, and contract granted for development of a management plan Phase I. Three to four SMEs are needed to support the project, two individuals have committed to assist. All SMEs should have experience with crew leadership and have been an L instructor. Shane Olpin will be the Leadership Committee point of contact for the project. Shane Olpin and Jim Cook. L and L were successfully revised and are now available through PMS.
Shane Olpin advised the group that very few changes were made to L, and less than 20 percent of L content was in need of updating. The leadership website was expanded to include a web pages and documents relating to conducting the FLAC section of L Shane Olpin for Bill Miller presented issues and concerns related to vendor currency and lead instructor approval. Specific discussion related to lead instructors leaving an approved vendor and how vendors certify their lead instructors.
Ted Mason expressed similar concerns for L The group determined that a small team should review the evaluation processes to determine whether or not changes are needed. As a former Incident Commander, Joe Ferguson presented his thoughts about the future of training our senior wildland firefighting leaders and challenged the group to create a vision statement. Rob Fitkin explained the ISD process and his role in training development in preparation for interacting with vendors at the conference. Ted Mason advised the group that the new L Steering Group is in place and functional.
Due to the early retirement of Bill Molumby and pressing issues related to L, the hand off scheduled for this meeting occurred earlier this fall. Recommendations from the L evaluation team led to a lead instructor transition from Saleen to Kurt Braun. Braun is working with the Great Basin to create a new, government-owned L training package which will be tested during the Beta testing in March The MyFireCommunity website has been used for communication with the Braun during the development of a new training package. NAFRI has been distributing the course materials pre-course work and student workbooks.
Future L course materials distribution will be done through the vendor. The website was updated to reflect changes in providers and name change. The group discussed the status of the L evaluation form revision. Kurt La Rue notified the group that the form under revision and will be available in the near future. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, which formed the enemy's advance.
Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss, till he had gained the position assigned him. This is a crest in front of the heavy forest, and in range of Anderson's rifle-pits. McLaws is in his front, and deploys across the pike, Semmes on the left of the road, Mahone, Perry, and Wofford on the right. Jordan's battery is posted on the Mine road. Sykes brings up Weed's battery, and opens on Semmes, and drives in his skirmishers, but can make no serious impression on his line.
McLaws sends word to Jackson that Sykes is attacking in force, and that the country is favorable for a flank attack. Jackson orders Kershaw through the woods to join Semmes's left, and sends Wilcox up the Mine road to extend the Confederate right, and head off a Federal advance from this direction. Sykes thus finds himself overlapped on both flanks. His position is difficult, but he determines to hold it as long as possible.
It is noon. No sounds are heard from the parallel columns. Sykes has to make his line very thin, but holds his ground. If supported, he can maintain himself. But at this juncture he receives orders to fall back on Chancellorsville, and slowly retires to McGee's; later to his old position, Hancock taking his place in the front line; and he next morning at daylight is also withdrawn, and takes up the line he retains until Sunday morning.
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Slocum, in like manner on the plank road, meets Posey and Wright, and a small affair occurs. But Wright is sent along the unfinished railroad, and outflanks him.
Stonewall Jackson Makes His Fatal Reconnaissance – But On Which Road?
He is also at this moment ordered to retire. Meade has had similar orders, and has likewise withdrawn; and Wilcox is sent to Banks's Ford to hold it. Wright continues his movement along the railroad, as far as Welford's or Catherine's Furnace, when, finding himself beyond communication with his superior, he, in connection with Stuart, who has been holding this point, determines to feel the Union line. Two regiments and a battery are thrown in along the road to Dowdall's Tavern, preceded by skirmishers.
Our pickets fall back, and through the dense wood the Confederates reach our line. But they are warmly received, and retire.
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This is six P. Wright now joins his division. Jackson's divisions, thus following up our retiring columns, by nightfall occupy a line from Mine road to Welford's Furnace. A regiment of cavalry is on the Mine road, and another on the river road as outposts. Stuart remains at the Furnace. This movement towards Fredericksburg was not a sudden idea of Hooker's, but the result of a carefully studied plan. In his order of April 3, to Sedgwick, he says that he proposes to assume the initiative, advance along the plank road, and uncover Banks's Ford, and at once throw bridges across.
Butterfield, in a communication to Sedgwick of April 30, says, "He Hooker expected when he left here, if he met with no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg to-morrow noon or shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrow night. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his detaching an overwhelming force to his left.
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Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight near Banks's Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that point from below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick's crossing. There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness, in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville.
This is, of all places in that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general commanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towards Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings, woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms. Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, and advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from imperative reasons alone.
Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, thus: "They"—the forces on the turnpike and plank road—"had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be advancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged from the forest at that moment" this is a very imperfect statement of the facts ; "but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist the advance of Gen.
Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail. On assuming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon repulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground. It could not live there. The roads through the forest were not unlike bridges to pass. A mile or more in advance of the position I had would have placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior forces, the enemy would in all probability have been beaten. This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts.
Listen to his subordinates' statements. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with reference to this falling-back: "It was totally unexpected to me: I thought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible. We had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them.
My opinion is that we should not have been withdrawn, called back, on Friday afternoon. We had advanced along the road to Fredericksburg to attack the enemy: the troops were in fine spirits, and we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to have fought the enemy there. They came out, and attacked one division of the corps I belonged to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville.
What caused Gen. Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this general position, which was about perpendicular to the plank road leading to Fredericksburg, I am not able to say, because, being only a division commander, the facts were not stated to me. But I have heard it said that he received some erroneous information about the enemy's advancing on his flank from the direction of Orange Court House.
It was my opinion, we should have attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from the enemy. He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to Chancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerable confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into place. Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground "produced among the soldiers a feeling of uncertainty. Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at Chancellorsville I believe, if all But I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen.
Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, when the latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker's orders to retire, while he Warren galloped back to headquarters to explain the importance of holding the position, which was formidable and had great tactical advantages.
Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could get back to the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and the position lost.
Battle of Chancellorsville Conclusion
He says: "I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville. I should have advanced and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him to attack me. The character of the country was the great reason for advancing. And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Army of the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertainty engendered by the withdrawal from Jackson's front on this unlucky day. A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Friday evening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making the advance again.
Warren says: "I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument. He could not appreciate the weakness of assuming the defensive in the midst of the elan of a successful advance.